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Abstract 
On the base of the nature of Shapely Value, the construction of Shapely Value in cooperative game is analyzed in this 
paper, and it is concluded that Shapely Value is made up of two parts, one part depends on individual itself, and the 
other part depends on the state of individual in alliance. Then the construction of Shapely Value is used to discuss the 
enterprise alliance and the rent of enterprise alliance is put forward, finally some interesting conclusions are presented 
in the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
The cooperative game is a competitive decision-making model in which the individual player 
cooperate with some player to get result as most as possible. [1] In real life, the complementarity and two-
win are both the result of cooperative game. In cooperative game, the players are both in competition and 
in cooperation with others for more benefit and what they do are helpful to the development of society. [2] 
In cooperative game, the key and core of game is the profit allocation of players. Shapely Value is one 
of the most important methods, and is widely used in the study of dynamic enterprise alliance. In paper 
[3], LIU Lang discussed application of the Shapley Value in game analysis of benefit distribution of agile 
virtual enterprise. ZHENG Liqun studied the residual Claim assignment mechanism of Stock Corporation 
and its axiomatic analysis in [4]. ZHANG Daowu put up a method to synthesize the performance of 
alliance members of cooperation innovation in [5]. Paper [6] showed a strategy for cost sharing among 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of ICAPIE Organization 
Committee. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
1378  Xu Xiaofeng and Ruan Aiqing / Physics Procedia 24 (2012) 1377 – 1384
Author name / Physics Procedia 00 (2011) 000–000 
partners under VMI based on the Shapley Value. DAI Jian-hua discussed the strategy of profit allocation 
among partners in dynamic alliance based on the Shapley Value in paper [7]. 
In the literature of Shapley Value, there are mainly applications of Shapley Value, and lack of the 
construction analysis. The paper will discuss the construction of Shapley Value and its economy 
implications, on which the rent of alliance and the benefit of alliance system is studied. 
The rest of this paper is organized as following. In section II, based on the model of Shapley Value and 
its solution, the construction of Shapley Value is discussed ant its generality is proved. We propose the 
rent of enterprise alliance and individual, also the benefit of alliance system in section III. Based on the 
theory and new analysis of this problem, we present the example of enterprise alliance to illustrate the 
economy significance in section IV, and we draw conclusions in section V. 
2. The construction of shapely value 
2.1 The model and solution of shapley Value 
Example-1 Assume that three main enterprises, A, B and C  will compose one enterprise alliance. This 
is a typical tri-cooperative game. It is estimated that the profit allocation of different alliance system is 
shown in Table I. 
In Table I, Av , Bv and Cv  are respectively the benefit of players when they operate without 
cooperation. 
TABLE I. profit allocation of different alliance system 
alliance
system A B C
Operation
independence Av Bv Cv
Alliance of 
two of three 
enterprises, 
the left 
independen
ce
BA∪ Part of ABv Cv′
CB∪ Av′  Part of BCv
CA∪ Part of 
ACv Bv
′ Part of ACv
Alliance of 
three
enterprises 
A B C∪ ∪ Part of ABCv
Definition 1 (independence profit of player) In cooperative game, the return of the player when it 
operates itself without cooperation is called independence profit of player, marked as v . The 
independence profit of player- A is noted as Av .
Then according to the Formula (1) of Shapely Value, 
( 1)!( )![ ( ) ( { })]
( )
!A S N
s n s v S v S A
v
n⊂
− − − −Φ = ∑  (1) 
Here, S means the number of the member of alliance, 
( 1)!( )!
!
n
w S
n
s s− −= .
The count process of Av  is presented by Table II.  
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So that, the profit allocation of player- A is
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3 6 6 3A A AB B AC C ABC BC
v v v v v v v vΦ = + − + − + −
1 1
( ) ( )
6 3AB AC B C A BC ABC
v v v v v v v= + − − + − +  (2) 
TABLE II. The count process of Av
S A A B∪ A C∪ A B C∪ ∪
( )v S Av ABv ACv ABCv
\S A 0 Bv Cv BCv
( )
( \ )
v S
v S A
−
Av AB Bv v− AC Cv v− ABC BCv v−
S 1 2 2 3 
w S 1
3
1
6
1
6
1
3
Aϕ 1
3 A
v
1
( )
6
AB B
v v− 1 ( )
6
AC C
v v− 1 ( )
3
ABC BC
v v−
Similarly, 
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
6 3B AB BC A C B AC ABC
v v v v v v v vΦ = + − − + − +   (3) 
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
6 3C AC BC A B C AB ABC
v v v v v v v vΦ = + − − + − +  (4) 
The result of mode is [ ], , TA B CΦ = Φ Φ Φ .
2.2 The construction of Shapley Value  
According to the axiom of Shapley Value [2], there exists the nature of super 
additivity: ( ) ( )
i S
v S v i
∈
∑; [3],  if ,R S N⊂ , and R S∩ =∅ , then ( ) ( ) ( )v R S v R v S∪ ≥ + .
So assume ABv ≥ Av + Bv , let ABv ＝ Av + Bv + ABa , in which, 
ABa 0≥ ,                                                       (5) 
Similarly, assume 
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BCv ≥ Bv + Cv , let BCv = Bv + Cv + BCa , of which,  
BCa 0≥ ,                                                                            (6) 
ACv ≥ Av + Cv , let ACv = Av + Cv + ACa , of which, 
ACa 0≥ ,                                                                           (7) 
ABCv ≥ Av + Bv + Cv , let ABCv = Av + Bv + Cv +, of which,  
ABCa 0≥ .                                                              (8) 
Take the value of Formula (5)-(8) into Formula (2)-(4), there are 
1 1( ) ( ) ( )6 3A A AB AC ABC BCv v a a a aΦ = + + + −    (9) 
1 1( ) ( ) ( )6 3B B AB BC ABC ACv v a a a aΦ = + + + −   (10) 
1 1( ) ( ) ( )6 3C C BC AC ABC ABv v a a a aΦ = + + + −   (11)    
It is obvious that the profit allocation of player in tri-cooperative game is made up two parts. 
One part is Av , Bv  and Cv , which respectively is the benefit of player when it operates independence, 
which depends on the capability of itself. 
The other part is the exceed return which comes from the cooperation system. It depends on four 
coefficients, ( ABa , BCa , ACa and ABCa ). The coefficients are respectively the above benefit of alliance of 
subscript. And the relationship of coefficients represents the important and the contribution of player to 
alliance. 
Theorem 1 In a cooperative game with n players, the profit of one player by Shapely Value composes 
two parts, one is the independence profit of player, the other is the exceed return from the contribution of 
player to alliance. 
Prove. In a cooperative game with n players, independence profit of player 1, 2, ,n" are 
respectively 1 2, , , nv v v" , and ,i jv ( , 1, 2, ,i j n= " , i j≠ ) is the benefit of alliance of subscript. 
Let , ,i j i j i jv v v a= + + , , 0i ja ≥ , similarly, the profit of alliance of random r players is 
1, 2, , 1,2, ,t t tr n=" " , 1 2t t tr≠ ≠ ≠" , and let 1, 2, , 1 2 1, 2, ,t t tr t t tr t t trv v v v a= + + + +" "" .
According to Formula (1), the profit allocation of player- k ( 1, 2, ,k n= " ) is discussed.
When 1s = ,
( 1)!( )![ ( ) ( { })]
!S N
s n s v S v S A
n⊂
− − − −∑ 0( 1)! ( )! k
n
v v
n
− −= 1 kvn= ,
When 2s = ,
( 1)!( )![ ( ) ( { })]
!S N
s n s v S v S k
n⊂
− − − −∑ ,1 ( 2)!!k k ii k
n
v a
n n ≠
−= + ∑ ,
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When 3s = ,
( 1)!( )![ ( ) ( { })]
!S N
s n s v S v S A
n⊂
− − − −∑ , , ,1 2!( 3)! ( )!k k i j i ji j k
n
v a a
n n ≠ ≠
−= + −∑ ,"" ,
When s r= ,
( 1)!( )![ ( ) ( { })]
!S N
s n s v S v S A
n⊂
− − − −∑         , 2, , 2, 3, ,
2
( 1)!( )!
( )
!
k
k t tr t t tr
k t tr
v r n r
a a
n n ≠ ≠ ≠
− −= + −∑ " "
"
,"" ,
When s n= ,
( 1)!( )![ ( ) ( { })]
!S N
s n s v S v S A
n⊂
− − − −∑ 1,2, , 1, , 1, 1, ,1 ( 1)! ( )!k n k k n
n
v a a
n n − +
−= + −" " " .
Then ( )k vΦ = kv + ,( 2)!! k ii k
n a
n ≠
− ∑ +
, , ,
2!( 3)! ( )
! k i j i ji j k
n a a
n ≠ ≠
−+ −∑ +""+
, 2, , 2, 3, ,
2
( 1)!( )! ( )
! k t tr t t trk t tr
r n r a a
n ≠ ≠ ≠
− −+ −∑ " "
"
+
""+ 1,2, , 1, , 1, 1, ,( 1)!( )! n k k n
n a a
n − +
− −" " "
kv= + { }
( 1)!( )!( )
!
S S k
S N
s n s a a
n
−
⊂
− − −∑
PartI PartII+
So that “ PartI ” is the independence profit of player- k , and “ PartII ” behalves the contribution of 
player- k  in alliance. (Proved)
3. The rent of Enterprise Alliance 
Base on the construction of Shapley Value, the rent of enterprise alliance and individual will be 
discussed. 
Definition 2 (the rent of enterprise alliance) In cooperative game with n players, the exceed benefit of 
enterprise alliance N , which is more than the sum of independence profit of all players, is called the rent 
of enterprise alliance, marked RA , that is, 
( ) ( ) ( )
i N
RA N v N v i
∈
= −∑ { }( 1)!( )!( )! S S kk S S N
s n s a a
n
−
∈ ⊂
− − −=∑∑                      (12) 
Definition 3 (the individual rent of enterprise alliance) In cooperative game with n players, the exceed 
benefit of some one player in enterprise alliance N , which is more than the independence profit of it, is 
called the individual rent of enterprise alliance, marked SRA , that is, the individual rent of enterprise 
alliance of player- k is 
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( ) ( )k k kSRA N v v= Φ −
{ }( 1)!( )!( )
!
S S k
S N
s n s a a
n
−
⊂
− − −= ∑
 , 1, 2, ,k n= �
                  (13) 
Theorem 2 In cooperative game with n players, the rent of enterprise alliance N is the sum of the 
individual rent of enterprise alliance of all player members of enterprise alliance N , that is to say,
( ) ( )k
k S
RA N SRA N
∉
=∑
                                          (14) 
Prove. From profit allocation and Formula (12) and (13), 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ) ( )
k
i N k N i N
k k k
k N k N
RA N v N v i v v i
v v SRA N
∈ ∈ ∈
∈ ∈
= − = Φ −
= Φ − =
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
(Proved.) 
Definition 4 (the efficiency of alliance system) the ratio of the rent of enterprise alliance to the cost of 
alliance establishment is called the efficiency of alliance system, noted as ( )EA N . And 
( )EA N = RA / ( )CA S , here ( )CA S is the cost of alliance N  establishment. 
Definition 5 (the efficiency of individual in alliance) the ratio of the individual rent of enterprise 
alliance to the individual cost of alliance establishment is called the efficiency of individual in alliance in 
alliance N ., noted as ( )iSEA N . And ( )iSEA N = SRA / SCA , here SCA  is the cost of individual for 
alliance N establishment.  
It is obvious that the efficiency of alliance system is important index which decides the stable station 
of alliance. The more the efficiency of alliance system, the more likely the player goes into alliance, and 
the more stable of the alliance. One the hand, the stability of individuals of alliance depends on the 
efficiency of individual in alliance. 
Proposition 1 In cooperative game with n  players, the member, who controls the most resource of 
alliance, will get the most individual rent of enterprise alliance. 
It will be proved in the condition of three members. Assume that Player-A, B, and C would establish 
an alliance. And the most competitive resource is controlled by member-B. So the alliance of A&C would 
get a small rent of enterprise alliance, and presume ACa has a small value, and 
then, ACa ABaδ= ≺≺ , AC BCa aδ= ≺≺ , and AC ABCa aδ= ≺≺ .
In this condition, there will be ( ) ( )B ASRA N SRA N� and ( ) ( )B CSRA N SRA N� .
Prove. By Formula (9) and (13), then 
( )ASRA N = ( )A Av vΦ −
1 ( 2 2 )6 AB ABC BC ACa a a a= + − +                             (15) 
By Formula (10), (11) and (13), then 
( )BSRA N = ( )B Bv vΦ −
1 ( 2 2 )6 AB ABC AC BCa a a a= + − +                     (16) 
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( )CSRA N = ( )C Cv vΦ −
1 ( 2 2 )6 BC ABC AB ACa a a a= + − +                             (17) 
By (15)-(17) and the situation above mentioned, 
( ) ( )B ASRA N SRA N−
1 1(3 3 ) ( ) 06 2BC AC BC ACa a a a= − = − ;
( ) ( )B CSRA N SRA N−
1 1(3 3 ) ( ) 06 2AB AC AB ACa a a a= − = − ;
Therefore, ( ) ( )B ASRA N SRA N; and ( ) ( )B CSRA N SRA N; ,  that is to say, the member which 
controls key resource archives the most individual rent of enterprise alliance. 
This conclusion is general in the real life. Take the sale of production as an example, some super-
market with great scale controls the channels of sale which is the most important channel between 
enterprise and customers. Hence this super-market will get the most individual rent of enterprise alliance 
if the customers are always faithful. 
4. Example 
Example-2 There are three different schools (A, B, and C) which will cooperate in a training project in 
an area. Before cooperation, they have their resource and stable income. Now assume that only A has the 
credential of training, B and C have not. Assume that the return function of alliance is shown in Table III, 
and the cost of individual of A, B, and C is respectively 700, 400, and 500 thousands RMB.  
Table III the income function of alliances of three schools
( )v S Av Bv Cv ABv ACv BCv ABCv
Ten 
thousands 
(RMB) 
200 100 150 450 550 300 200 
By the Formula (1), (12), (13), we could get the rent of enterprise alliance and the individual rent of 
enterprise alliance. And by the Definition 4 and 5, the result is presented in Table IV.  
It is concluded from Table IV that, school-A will get the most individual rent of enterprise alliance 
(141.7), and also the most efficiency of individual in alliance. Why the situation happens is that school-A 
has the most import resource of alliance.  
5. Conclusion 
The paper analyzed the construction of Shapley Value based on which the rent and the efficiency of 
enterprise alliance are discussed. And the conclusion prove that he member of alliance with competitive 
resource will gain the most individual rent of enterprise alliance.  
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Table IV the result of Example-1(Ten thousands RMB) 
Symbol A B C
Shapley Value ( )i vΦ 341.7 166.7 241.7
the cost of individual 
for alliance
establishment 
SCA 70 40 50 
the individual rent of 
enterprise alliance SRA 141.7 66.7 91.7 
the efficiency of 
individual in alliance 
( )iSEA N 2.02 1.67 1.83 
the rent of enterprise 
alliance RA 300 
the cost of alliance
establishment 
( )CA S 160 
the efficiency of 
alliance system 
( )EA N 1.88 
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